An attack on MySQL's login protocol by Arce, Ivan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
6.
24
11
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
1 J
un
 20
10
An attack on MySQL’s login protocol
Ivan F.F. Arce Emiliano Kargieman Gerardo Richarte
Carlos Sarraute Ariel Waissbein
January 24, 2002
Abstract
TheMySQL challenge–and–response authentication protocol is proved
insecure. We show how can an eavesdropper impersonate a valid user
after witnessing only a few executions of this protocol. The algorithm
of the underlying attack is presented. Finally we comment about im-
plementations and statistical results.
1 Introduction
The use of computer-based user authentication has become a cryptographic
tool widely used in these days. Every remote connection (SSH, SSL, et cetera)
is initiated with a user authentication. This also holds true for remote ac-
cess databases as the MySQL Database Engine. Computer-based user
authentication amounts to one of different process by which an entity, the
user, is able to authenticate himself by way of a cryptographic protocol to
another entity, often a server, in such a way that no other person —than the
user— can do this. Different standards exist for user authentication such as
zero–knowledge cryptography (e.g., Fiat–Shamir [3], Guillon–Quisquater [6]
or Schnorr [9, 10] identification protocols), or challenge–and–response proto-
cols (e.g., see Kerberos [7], the Secure Shell authentication protocols [5] see
also [13]).
MySQL Database Engine ([2]) is a world known open source database
engine enabling remote access through secured channels. This package is
widely used in many applications such as world wide web portals and intranet
services and has become a standard in its category.
The MySQL scenario is constituted by a server, which centralizes all
the information in a database to which validated users, called clients, have
access by logging on the server through an authentication procedure. When
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a client authenticates himself to the server, he can then start a session and
succeedingly obtain any information from the database in the server. This
information then, travels through information channels encrypted with a key
negotiated between the client and server, and can thus, only be read by
this client. Different parameters as to how this is done can and are selected
by server administrators. However, all this possible configurations have in
common the same authentication procedure.
The authentication protocol is designed by the MySQL team with a
twofold purpose, to prevent the flow of plaintext passwords over the net-
work, and the storage of them in plaintext format on the server’s and user’s
respective terminals. For these purposes, a challenge–response mechanism
for authentication is chosen together with a hash function. There is no men-
tion of this authentication mechanism in the literature as it was designed by
the MySQL development team and never published. The authentication pro-
cedure we describe here is extracted from the source code1 implemented on
every version of MySQL. Slight variations are to be found between versions
prior to 3.20, and versions after 3.21.
Regrettably, this authentication mechanism is not cryptographically strong.
Firstly we shall see that the second objective is not met, since the only
value needed to authenticate a user is stored both in his machine as in the
server. But moreover, we shall see that, each time a user underpasses a
challenge–and–response execution, information allowing an attacker to re-
cover this user’s password is leaked.
In view of these vulnerabilities which we describe in Section 2 we designed
an attack —described in Subsection 3— which permits an eavesdropper to
authenticate to the database engine impersonating the witnessed valid user
after only witnessing a few successful authentications of this user.
We shall prove that all the contents of a MySQL database can be obtained
by sniffing a few client authentications. In fact, our algorithmic construct
works in such a way that, for every time a client authenticates himself to
the server he narrows the key search space almost in an exponential manner.
That is, this is done in such a way that starting with a brute–force key
search space of 264, we are reduced to a search space of 300 after only 10
authentications!
Previous vulnerabilities in the MySQL Database Engine where dis-
covered in the Bugtraq advisories [8], [12] and [4]. An advisory authored
by the subscribers which briefly describes this attack appeared as a Bugtraq
Advisory in [1].
1available at http://www.mysql.com
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2 Technical Description
2.1 The challenge/response mechanism
The authentication protocol ofMySQL Database Engine is of the challenge–
and–response type, the underlying idea behind this construction is that
no passwords are sent between client and server through the connection.
The challenge-response mechanism of MySQL does the following (From
mysql-3.22.32/sql/password.c). MySQL provides users with two primi-
tives used for the authentication protocol:
• a hash function, and
• a (supposedly) one–way function;
both of their own design. The protocol goes as follows. On connection, when
a user wants to log in, a random string is generated by the server and sent to
the client —this is the challenge. The client, using as input the hash value
of the random string he has received and the hash value of his password,
calculates a new string using the one–way function —the response— which
is sent to the server.
This checksum string is sent to the server, where it is compared with a
string generated from the stored hash value of the password and the random
string. The password is saved (in user.password) by using the PASSWORD( )
function in mysql. If the server calculates the same string as the response,
the user is authenticated.
2.2 Problem Description
The hash function provided by MySQL outputs eight-bytes strings, this
makes 264 possibilities. Whereas the one–way function outputs eight-bytes
strings, but with only 245 possibilities, having a fixed input size of 8 bytes.
From this we deduce that more than one hashed password produces the same
(expected) response for a given challenge. That is, we shall show that for a
given challenge, not only the original password gives the correct response, but
a much larger collection of values —standing for different hashed passwords—
also do (see Section 4). We wish to remark that only the one–way function
shall be analyzed and proved insecure, whereas the hash function shall not
be analyzed.
We also point out that the authentication mechanism of MySQL does
not require the password for a successful authentication, but the password’s
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hash value. Hence, to impersonate a user only the hash value of this user’s
password is needed, so that the hash function is of no interest for this account.
To validate our claim, we explain why the hash value of the password can
be efficiently calculated using only a few executions of the challenge–and–
response mechanism for the same user. More explicitly, in the forth–coming
section we exploit this weakness, and deduce an attack much more efficient
than brute–force attack can be carried out in only a few hours on a personal
computer (see Section 4). Explicitly, after gaining a positive number of pairs
of challenge and response, an eavesdropper is able to efficiently calculate
the set of values, standing for hashed passwords, that pass the intercepted
challenge and response pairs.
To do this, firstly we describe how does the MySQL one–way function
work and proceed to analyze the scheme’s security, and then describe the
attack we devised. The actual algorithm for making this calculations will
be described in the Section 3. The algorithm we describe was implemented
in Squeak Smalltalk (see [11]) by co–authors Gerardo Richarte and Carlos
Sarraute. All the empirical results herein provided are derived from that
implementation and the figures 1, 2 and 3 (in subsections 1 and 3) are cut–
and–pasted black and white screen images of this implementation.
Let n := 230 − 1 (here n is the max value used in randominit( ) and
old randoninit( ) respectively). Fix a user U . And initiate a challenge
and response. That is, suppose the server has sent a challenge to the user U .
The hash value of this user’s password is 8 bytes long. Denote by p1 the first
(leftmost) 4 bytes of this hash value and by p2 the last 4 bytes (rightmost).
Likewise, let c1 denote the first 4 bytes of the challenge’s hash value and c2
the last 4. We describe how to calculate the output of the one–way function
and how is this une–way function used.
1. calculate the values s1 := p1⊕ c1 and s2 := p2⊕ c2 (here ⊕ denotes the
bitwise exclusive or (X–or) function, and s1 and s2 are the input to the
one–way function),
2. calculate recursively for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8:
s1 = s1 + 3 · s2 modulo (n)
s2 = s1 + s2 + 33 modulo (n)
wi =
⌊
31 · s1
n
⌋
+ 64
(here ⌊x⌋ := max{k ∈ Z : k ≤ x} is the floor function)
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3. calculate form the preceding values
s1 = s1 + 3 · s2 modulo (n)
s2 = s1 + s2 + 33 modulo (n)
w9 =
⌊
31 · s1
n
⌋
4. output the checksum value
w =
(
(w1 ⊕ w9)
∥∥ . . . . . . ‖ (w7 ⊕ w9) ‖ (w9 ⊕ w9))
It is this checksum w ∈ {0, 1}64 that is sent, by U , to the server. The
server, that has in store the hash value of U ’s password, recalculates the
checksum by this same process and succinctly verifies the authenticity of the
value it has received. However it is a small collection of these checksums
that allows any attacker to obtain p1 and p2 (the hash value of the user’s
password) and hence, enables the attacker to impersonate any user with
only the information that travels on the wire between server and client (the
user U). Actually, at each step of the algorithm a set of values (p1, p2) is
calculated such that,
The reason why the process of producing the checksum out of the hash
values of both the password and the challenge, is insecure is that this process
can be efficiently reversed due to its rich arithmetic properties. More specif-
ically, consider the one–way function described above as a mapping f that
takes as input the two values X and Y and produces the checksum value
f(X, Y ) = w (e.g., in our case X := p1 ⊕ c1 and Y := p2 ⊕ c2). Then we can
efficiently calculate all of the values X ′, Y ′ which map to the same checksum
value than X, Y , i.e. if f(X, Y ) = w, then we calculate the set of all the
values X ′, Y ′ such that f(X ′, Y ′) = w. This set is of negligible size in com-
parison to the 264 points set of all the possible passwords’ hashes in which
it is contained. Furthermore, given a collection of challenge and response
pairs made between the same user and the server, it is possible to efficiently
calculate the set of all (hash values of) passwords passing the given tests.
3 The Algorithm For the Attack
We now give a brief description of the attack we propose. This description
shall enable readers to verify our assertion that the MySQL authentication
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scheme leaks information. This attack has been implemented on Squeak
Smalltalk and is now perfectly running. In what follows we shall depict the
procedures that constitute our attack. Since the attack is of a geometric
nature, we will be able to illustrate these procedures with screen snapshots
of the Squeak implementations.
The attack we designed is mainly divided into three stages. In these stages
we respectively use one of our three algorithmic tools in various opportunities.
Procedure 1 is an algorithmic process which has as input a checksum w, and outputs
a set of convex polygons P = {P} such that
– each P ∈ P is defined by its vertices,
– f−1({w}) =
⋃
P∈P P , e.g. the point (p1⊕ c1, p2⊕ c2) of Z
2 belongs
to a polygon P in P,
– #P = 36 or 48 (see Remark 1 on the next subsection), and
– #(Z2 ∩ P ) ∼ 233 (unproven estimate).
Procedure 2 An input is a pair of tuples (c,P), (c′,P ′) and an integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤
32, where c and c′ are different pairs of challenges, with respective
responses w and w′ such that f−1(w) = ∪PP and f
−1(w′) = ∪P ′P
′,
and such that P and P ′ are compliant with the four conditions stated
above. The output is a collection of polygons P˜ consisting of all the
polygons P˜ =
⋃
(P ∩ Q), the union taken over all the squares Q of
side 232−k and vertices with entries in {i · 2k : 0 ≤ i ≤ 232−k}, and all
the polygons P ∈ P in P for which there exists a P ′ ∈ P ′ such that
(P ⊕ c) ∩ (P ′ ⊕ c′) 6= ∅.
Procedure 3 Given a set of integer points Z and a collection of pairs (c(1), w(1)), . . . ,
(c(t), w(t)) as input (n ∈ Z, n ≥ 2), this procedure outputs a new col-
lection of points Z ′ such that every point z in Z ′ passes the n given
challenges (i.e. f(z, c(k)) = w(k) for all z ∈ Z ′).
The rest of this section goes as follows, the three first forth–coming sub-
sections correspond to the three algorithmic tools we just described. On the
fourth and last subsection we explain how are these tools used in the attack
and prove the attack effective.
3.1 From brute–force to brute forge
In the preceding paragraphs of this section we have stated the input/output of
Procedure 1. This subsection is devoted to this procedure we call algorithmic
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tool number 1, which we follow to describe. As explained, Procedure 1,
from a pair of challenge and response (c, w) produces a set of polygons P
containing all the hashed passwords passing the same challenge, i.e. P is such
that f−1(w) = ∪P∈P(P ⊕ c). We explain why are the elements of P convex
polygons and why is it the case that this is a natural way of representing this
particular set of points (i.e. f−1(w)), subsequently we describe the algorithm
underlying these procedure.
For any (hashed) password p, and a (hashed) challenge c, the correspond-
ing response is calculated by the process described in the previous section. To
invert this process, we inspect the one–way function f more closely. Suppose
with out loss of generality that w1, . . . , w8) are known (e.g. w9 is known).
Later in this section, in Remark 2, we justify this supposition by explaining
how is this problem tackled.
From the definition of the w1, . . . w8 it follows that 64 ≤ wi < 96 (and
for w9 it is 0 ≤ w9 < 32). For the input X = p1 ⊕ c1 and Y = p2 ⊕ c2,
it holds that the entries wi ∈ Z verify a certain formula of the form wi =
⌊31
n
(
(αi ·X + βi · Y + γi · 33) mod (n)
)
⌋+ 64 for some integers αi, βi, γi ∈ Z,
where the αi, βi, γi can be calculated for once and for all. For example,
w1 =
⌊31
n
(3X + Y mod (n))
⌋
+ 64,
w2 =
⌊31
n
(12X + 5Y + 33 mod (n))
⌋
+ 64,
...
w8 =
⌊31
n
(322863X + 140206Y + 33 · 42450 mod (n))
⌋
+ 64,
w9 =
⌊31
n
(1389207X + 603275Y + 33 · 182656 mod (n))
⌋
.
Notice that for the floor operation it holds that ⌊x⌋ ≤ x < ⌊x⌋+1. Then
from the value of w1, we deduce that the inequation
n
31
(w1 − 64) ≤ 3X + Y mod (n) <
n
31
((w1 − 64) + 1)
holds, i.e. there exists an integer δ1 ∈ Z such that
n
31
(w1 − 64) + δ1n ≤
3X+Y < n
31
((w1−63)+δ1n. Furthermore, form the fact that 0 ≤ X, Y < 2
32
we deduce that 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ ⌈
4·232
n
⌉ − 1 = 16.
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Figure 1: A polygon
For w2, . . . , w8 similar equations hold. By a similar process to the one we
just applied to the defining equation of w1, we deduce that
n
31
(wi − 64) + δin ≤ αi ·X + βiY + γi · 33 <
n
31
((wi − 63) + δin (1)
where here the bounds for the δi can be analogously deduced, i.e., it follows
that δi <
⌈
232(αi+βi)+33γi
n
⌉
.
In this way, an attacker, for each choice of δ1, . . . , δ8 is able to construct
the convex polygon
Pδ :=
⋂
1≤i≤8
{
(x, y) ∈ R2 :
n
31
(w1 − 64) + δin ≤ αi ·X + βiY + γi · 33 <
<
n
31
((w1 − 63) + δin
}
,
seen in Picture 1. We thus see that for every δ = (δ1, . . . , δ8), for every integer
point (a, b) in Pδ ∩ Z
2 it holds that f(c, (a, b)) = w. In fact it is easy to see
that the other inclusion also holds, i.e., for every pair (a, b) which is mapped
via f to the checksum s there exist a tuple δ = (δ1, . . . , δ8) such that (a, b)
belongs to Pδ.
We shall see that many choices of the δ will define the same polygon.
Furthermore, we prove that P := ∪P (where the union is taken over all the
possible tuples δ1, . . . , δ8 ∈ Z), is a collection of 36 or 48 polygons in the next
remark.
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Remark 1 Let P be defined as above. Then, each P ∈ P is a traslation of
the other, i.e. for every P, P ′ ∈ P there exists v ∈ Z2 such that P = P ′ + v.
Furthermore, it holds that #P is equal to either 36 or 48.
Proof: The traslation statement is straight–forward . What the procedure
we described does, is constructing polygons by intersecting the convex poly-
gons defined by equations (1) and the square [0, 232]× [0, 232]. The different
polygons that appear in P are generated by the different choices of ki in the
equations (1) and nothing else, this choices of ki shift the different defining
lines kin upwards. The tangents of the different lines (which define the poly-
gons) respective to w1, . . . , w8 are for every choice of challenge and password
3, 2.4, 2.3181, 2.3052, 2.3031, 2.3028, 2.3027, 2.3027 all rounded to the fourth
decimal.
To prove the second statement, let P be a polygon in P with vertices
(a1, b1), . . . , (at, bt) it is easy to see that the polygon with vertices (a1 +
in
3
, b1 + jn), . . . , (an + i
n
3
, bn + jn) can be produced by a different choice
of δ, for i, j ∈ Z. Before proving this, we notice that we are interested
only in those polygons which have a nonempty intersection with the square
[0, 232 − 1] × [0, 232 − 1] where the password is located. Since ⌊232/n
3
⌋ = 12
and ⌊232/n⌋ = 4, we deduce that #P ∼ 48. ✷
However, for our computational aims, we notice that the δi can be more
accurately bounded by the formula re-studying the calculation process for the
wi. The best bound for δ1 is the already calculated δ1 ≤ 16. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 we
write s
(i)
1 := 3s
(i−1)
1 + s
(i−1)
2 mod (n), and s
(i)
2 := s
(i−1)
1 + s
(i−1)
2 + 33 mod (n)
(where s
(0)
1 = X, s
(0)
2 = Y ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, denote by ǫi and ǫ
′
i the integers
such that s
(i)
1 = 3s
(i−1)
1 + s
(i−1)
2 − ǫin, and s
(i)
2 = s
(i)
1 + s
(i−1)
2 + 33 − ǫ
′
in.
Since 0 ≤ s
(i)
1 , s
(i)
2 < n, it follows that 0 ≤ ǫi ≤ 3 and 0 ≤ ǫ
′
i ≤ 2 and
s
(1)
2 = s
(1)
1 + s
(i−1)
2 + 33− ǫ
′
in.
Fix a user U with hashed password p. Denote by F (p, c) the function
that from a (hashed) password P and a (hashed) challenge c produces the
checksum w as explained in the previous section. Suppose that a pair (c, w)
of challenge and response corresponding to user U is known (e.g., to the
attacker). Denote, as in the previous section, the (32) more significant bits
of p and c by p1 and c1, and the (32) least significant bits by p2, c2 respectively.
Remark 2 By applying the algorithmic procedure just described to w[k] =
(w1⊕k ‖ . . . ‖w8⊕k) for 0 ≤ k < 32 only one value of k produces a nonempty
output, hence that value of k is precisely w9, i.e. we have w9 = k.
We will not prove this remark, since this result is totally dependent on the
specific parameters used for this authentication scheme. However, we do
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Figure 2: The polygons collection P
give a mild justification. Suppose that we have made our choice for a w9
candidate, say wˆ9, and that it is a wrong choice. Suppose furthermore that
the δi are already chosen. Then the polygon P defined by this choices is
P =
⋂
1≤i≤8
{
(x, y) ∈ R2 :
n
31
(wi ⊕ w9 ⊕ wˆ9 − 64) + δin ≤
αi ·X + βiY + γi · 33 <
n
31
((wi ⊕ w9 ⊕ wˆ9 − 63) + δin
}
.
Notice that each of the sets defined between brackets appearing in the
above intersection is a polygon, furthermore the two underlying lines at each
intersection n
31
(wi⊕w9⊕ wˆ9− 64) + δin = αi ·X + βiY + γi · 33 and
n
31
(wi⊕
w9 ⊕ wˆ9 − 63) + δin = αi ·X + βiY + γi · 33 are at a vertical distance of an
integer factor of n
31
. When the equations come out incorrectly the polygon
they define is shifted vertically (upwards or downwards) a distance which is
a factor of n
31
. This last fact, together with the fact explained in the previous
remark that the tangents of the lines of each of these polygons are quite
similar implies our assertion.
In Figure 2 we can see an image of the result of Procedure 1, four rows
of twelve polygons each. As we explained, this is a typical behavior.
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Figure 3: The second and third steps
3.2 Wash out of invalid passwords
Let be given a collection (c, w,P), (c′, w′,P ′) and an integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 32,
such that (c, w) and (c′, w′) are two pairs of challenge and response, and that
P and P ′ are the set of polygons respective to the given pairs of challenge
and response, and as produced with the Procedure 1.
To describe the output we define some notation. For every 0 ≤ i, j < 2k,
let
Q :=
[
i · 232−k, (i+ 1)·32−k
]
×
[
j · 232−k, (j + 1) · 232−k
]
.
And let Q denote the set of all these squares. Then, let P1 denote the set
P1 := ∪ (P ∩Q), where the union is taken over all Q ∈ Q, P ∈ P. Then the
output is the subset of P1 of all P1 ∈ P1 for which there exists a P
′ ∈ P ′
such that
(P ⊕ c) ∩ (P ′ ⊕ c′) 6= ∅,
this means that there exists a point (a1⊕ c, b1⊕ c) = (a
′⊕ c′, b′⊕ c′) for some
(a, b) ∈ P and (a′, b′) ∈ P ′ (so that f(a, b) = s and f(a′, b′) = s′).
The output is a collection of polygons P˜ consisting of all the polygons
P˜ =
⋃
(P ∩ Q), the union taken over all the squares Q of side 232−k and
vertices with entries in {i · 2k : 0 ≤ i ≤ 232−k}, and all the polygons P ∈ P
in P for which there exists a P ′ ∈ P ′ such that (P ⊕ c) ∩ (P ′ ⊕ c′) 6= ∅. In
Figure 2, we see two steps of this procedure over the chosen example.
Notice that we do not calculate ∪P∈P,P ′∈P ′P∩P
′, this would be inefficient,
e.g. it would make the size of the output grow and would not make much of
a difference in the point size of the output.
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3.3 Rising of passwords
Procedure 3 is straight forward and needs not much explanation. Given a
set of points and a pair of challenge and response, ones simply browses over
every point of this set calculating the checksum corresponding to this point
and the given challenge and adds it to the output set only if it produces the
given response.
3.4 The complete algorithmic attack
A complete attack to a valid user, who has produced the pairs of challenge
and response (c1, w1), . . . , (ct, wt) is done by repeated application of the pro-
cedures we have just described. To start with, we select the number k ≤ t
of these challenge and response pairs to which we are going to apply to
Procedure 1. That is for the pairs (c1, w1), . . . , (ck, wk) we apply the Proce-
dure 1and output collections P1, . . . ,Pk. Typically —on our examples— the
number k is taken to be 5 or less.
On a second step, after selecting a second integer 1 ≤ k′ ≤ 32 , we apply
Procedure 2 recursively to the triplets (c(1), w(1),P(1)), . . . , (c(k), w(k),P(k));
that is first we apply Procedure 2 to (c(1)1, w(1),P(1)) and (c(2), w(2),P(2))
using cubes of size 232−k
′
, then we apply Procedure 2 to the previous result
and (c(3), w(3),P(3)), and continue this recursive application until the k–th
tuple is reached. After doing this (the k applications of this procedure) we
get a set of polygons P˜ having a small number of integer points (compared
to the brute–force value 264).
Finally, we recursively apply Procedure 3 to the set P˜ and each of the
remaining challenge and response pairs (c(k+1), w(k+1)), . . . , (c(t), w(t)) as fol-
lows. First we extract every integer point of P˜ and store them as points.
Then we use Procedure 3 with the resulting set as input and (c(k+1), w(k+1)).
After we have finished with (c(k+j), w(k+j)), for j ≥ 1, we continue by apply-
ing Procedure 3 to the resulting set and (c(k+j+1), w(k+j+1)). We end when
we (c(t), w(t)) is reached and there are no more challenge and response pairs
left, or before if the set of remaining points has only one point left. In the
latter case we have found the password’s hash. Else, we get as output the set
of passwords’ hashes that pass every one of the challenge and response pairs
we have as input. It should be remarked, and shall be furtherly emphasized
by empiric data in the next section, that in the case of the output being a
set of more than one point, all of these points are not just random points in
[0, 232]× [0, 232], but have high probability of passing an additional test.
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4 Statistics and Conclusions
We coded the algorithm of the preceding section in Squeak Smalltalk, and
analyzed the results. In the examples tested, about 300 possible passwords
were left with the use of only 10 pairs of challenge and response. Notice that
in a plain brute–force attack about 264−300 = 18, 446, 744, 073, 709, 551, 316
would remain as possible passwords. It took about 100 pairs of challenge and
response to cut the 300 points set to a set containing 2 possible passwords
(i.e., a fake passwords and the password indeed). Finally it took about 300
pairs of challenge and response to get the password.
In other examples we used only ten pairs of challenge and response, get-
ting thus a set of approximately 300 points in each case. Then we randomly
selected 1000 challenges and made the 1000 tests to every one of the 300
points we had. The result was that each of the remaining points passed over
920 of the 1000 tests. That is, the mean (sample–mean) of the probability
a point (in the set left after applying our algorithm to ten pairs of challenge
and response) is of 92%.
We therefore are able to make a variety of attacks depending on the
amount of pairs of challenge and response we get from the user we want to
impersonate. The two extremal cases being very few pairs of challenge and
response from the same user, and a lot of pairs of challenge and response.
The second attack, that of many pairs of challenge and response captured,
is straight–forward: apply the algorithm described above until the password
is found. The first case, that of only a few pairs of challenge and response
captured, is as well easy to carry: simply apply the algorithm we described
with all the pairs of challenge and response captured, then use any possible
password in the set produced by the application of the algorithm for authen-
ticating yourself as a user (some of these fake passwords will still pass many
tests!).
We do not analyze the order of the complexities of our procedures because
we are working with an input of fixed size. Since every one of the attacks
we made was much alike in the performance/computation–time aspect, we
describe a specific example of an attack pointing out the computation time
needed at each step in the attack, and the amount of points left (in the
264 to 1 countdown of possible hashed passwords). In a specific example
we applied Procedure 1 to a pair of challenge and response calculating 48
polygons, each a traslation of the other, of area 233, which makes a set of
area approximately 238. The whole procedure application lasted no more
than half an hour in a Pentium 3 64Mb RAM personal computer. We applied
Procedure 1 to four other pairs of challenge and response obtaining similar
results. This constituted the first two hours and a half of the attack. The
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four applications of Procedure 2 lasted half an hour each, and resulted in
a collection of 32 polygons of area approximately 216 each, i.e. a set of
size 221. Finally we applied Procedure 3 getting the announced 300 possible
hashed passwords in about six hours and using only 10 pairs of challenge
and response. The complete attack lasted approximately twelve hours, in
this case we had available some 300 more challenge and response pairs and
were able to recover the hashed password in five more minutes.
Credits: This vulnerabilities were found and researched by Agustin Azubel,
Emiliano Kargieman, Gerardo Richarte, Carlos Sarraute and Ariel Waissbein
of CORE Security Technologies, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
A prior notification of these results appeared signed by researchers and
co–author Ivan Arce as “An advisory on MySQL’s login protocol” in Securi-
tyFocus’ Bugtraq newsgroup [1].
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